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ABSTRACT
The years 1988 to 1991 were a critical juncture in the history of Estonia. Crucial 
steps were taken during this time to assure that Estonian foreign policy would 
not be directed toward the East but primarily toward the integration with the 
West. In times of uncertainty and institutional flux, strong individuals with 
ideational power matter the most. This article examines the influence of For-
eign Minister Lennart Meri’s and Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar’s experienc-
es and historical consciousness on their visions of Estonia’s future position in 
international affairs. Life stories help understand differences in their horizons 
of expectation, and their choices in conducting Estonian diplomacy.
Keywords: historical imagination, critical junctures, foreign policy analysis, So-
viet Union, Baltic states, Lennart Meri
Much has been written about the Baltic states’ success in breaking away 
from Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and 
their decisive “return to the West”1 via radical economic, social and politi-
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Funding was also obtained from the “Estonia, the Baltic states and the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union: New Perspectives on the End of the Cold War” project, financed by the 
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1   The phrase is used as a chapter heading by Andres Kasekamp in A history of the Baltic 
states (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 172–197. Also see Return to the Western 
world: cultural and political perspectives on the Estonian post-communist transition, ed. 
by Marju Lauristin, Peeter Vihalemm (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997).
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cal reform. The Baltic states’ re-orientation toward the West immediately 
after independence was regained, as well as the denial and defying of their 
Soviet past has almost been taken for granted. This paper will scrutinize 
this assumption by studying the pre-history of Estonian foreign policy, from 
1988 to 1991, that is, in the years immediately preceding the regaining of 
independence in August 1991. We argue that at this time Estonia had sev-
eral alternative paths of development, with pro-Western integration being 
just one option, albeit probably the most popular. The key figure during 
this period was Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar (b. 1950), whose historical 
imagination and prognoses for the future were arguably the most impor-
tant for Estonia’s policies at the time. These did not point unequivocally to 
a desire to “return to the West”. Yet, in the context of the unsettled consti-
tutional and institutional landscape of the time, the legitimacy of Savisaar’s 
government was in doubt and intense competition ensued between several 
groups and individuals who were vying to gain the authority to identify and 
articulate Estonian interests in external affairs. The central question of this 
paper concerns how Estonia developed a coherent, decisively pro-Western 
approach, despite the confusion in the critical years before independence. 
There is as yet no in-depth analysis of this formative period, which 
proved to have lasting influence on Estonia’s position, orientation, and 
choices on the international stage.2 The political sociologist Richard Mole 
has focused on Estonian, as well as Latvian and Lithuanian, relations with 
Russia, but his analysis starts mostly from 1992.3 There is also the under-
lining problem that Mole tends to consider identities, upon which foreign 
policies rest, in essentialist terms as solid and immutable; as something that 
is constituted in reaction to a national other, that is, Russia or the Soviet 
Union.4 Maria Mälksoo has pointed out, however, that identities are not 
only constructed through interactions with other states, but also in inter-
action with their own societies and the multiple identities and discourses 
2  Toomas Alatalu’s articles, which are marked by a polemical style, are an exception. 
See Toomas Alatalu, “Peaminister Edgar Savisaare välispoliitiline ponnistus ‘Ida + 
Ida-Euroopa’ (mis jäi ajaloole jalgu)”, Poliitika, riigiteadus, rahvusvahelised suhted, 6 
(2014), 52–80; Toomas Alatalu, “Eesti välispoliitiline kontseptsioon – unistus ja ulme 
1990–1993”, ibid., 81–116; Toomas Alatalu, “Eesti poliitikute 1990ndate aastate geopolii-
tilised visioonid”, Poliitika, riigiteadus, rahvusvahelised suhted, 5 (2013), 112–141.
3  Richard Mole, The Baltic states from the Soviet Union to the European Union: identity, 
discourse and power in the post-Communist transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
(London: Routledge, 2013).
4  Mole, The Baltic states from the Soviet Union to the European Union, 80, 83. It should 
be noted that “Russia” and the “Soviet past” are not exactly the same.
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that constitute these groups.5 Focusing on a monolithic ethno-national 
identity, based on a particular reading of national history, has the disad-
vantage of passing over debates and struggles regarding the competing 
interpretations of history, the multiple views of identity and the visions 
of the future that were particularly pronounced between 1988–91.6 More-
over, in order for a narrative not to become a reading of the present into 
the past (or even an abuse of history in the Foucauldian sense),7 one can-
not ignore the role of contingency. 
To view the deterioration of Estonian–Russian relations in 1992 as inevi-
table – resulting from conflicting memories – is to read history backwards. 
Before 1992, the clash of identities did not run along the border of Esto-
nia and Russia, but crisscrossed societies on both sides. As the sociologist 
Peeter Vihalemm has noted, in the period between 1988–91 there was active 
political co-operation between democratic forces in Russia and those in 
the Baltic states, based on common perceptions of the Soviet era as being 
undemocratic and illegitimate.8 We argue that instead of the existence of 
a single ethno-nationalist identity constructing itself against the Russian 
or the Soviet “other”, there were multiple discourses and identities in the 
Estonian society, which not only reflected struggles over domestic policy, 
5  Maria Mälksoo, The politics of becoming European: a genealogy of Polish and Baltic 
post-Cold War security imaginaries, PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 2007), 16; 
Maria Mälksoo, The politics of becoming European: a study of Polish and Baltic post-Cold 
War security imaginaries (London: Routledge, 2010), 11, 15.
6  Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper point to the danger of regarding identity in 
essentialist terms, as was the case with the presentation of class in Marxist histories of 
class struggle. See Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’”, Theory 
and Society, 29:1 (2000), 1–47. In Mole’s narrative, the present Baltic-Russian conflict 
appears as an almost inevitable result of past identity formations.
7  Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche. Genealogy. History”, Language, counter-memory, practice: 
selected essays and interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. by Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 96–130. When interpreting Nietzsche, Foucault 
criticizes teleological approaches that search for the origins (Ursprung) of institutions, 
morals and values from the vantage point of the present.
8  Peeter Vihalemm, “National spaces in the Baltic area”, Return to the Western world, 
137. For example, there was an anti-imperialist faction within the Democratic Russia 
movement, headed by the historian Yuri Afanasyev and the physicist Lev Ponomaryov: 
Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The tragedy of Russia’s reforms: market Bolshevism 
against democracy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 
333–334. For more on Democratic Russia and its eventual support for a free exit from 
the Union, see Geoffrey A. Hosking, Jonathan Aves, and Peter J. S. Duncan, The road to 
post-Communism: independent political movements in the former Soviet Union, 1985–1991 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), 94–100.
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but also the different and often uncoordinated visions and activities in the 
international arena.9
Our hypothesis is that the period analyzed in our article marked a 
“critical juncture” in Estonian foreign policy, as it eliminated a number 
of alternative paths of development and created path dependences that 
shaped the country’s foreign policy for decades. According to Giovanni 
Capoccia and Daniel Kelemen, a critical juncture is a situation when struc-
tural constraints relax. This results in an increase in the range of choices 
available to powerful political actors in order to remodel existing institu-
tions. It is a time when agency is paramount.10 The political landscape of 
Estonia from 1988 to 1991 does seem to match the description of a critical 
juncture: the situation was in constant flux, old institutions were chang-
ing and being replaced by alternatives that claimed legitimacy and power. 
Hierarchies of power were ambivalent, thereby undermining the sway of 
powerful actors of institutional constraint that would normally diminish 
the range of choices available in times of stability. We believe agency was 
important in this period and therefore we will analyze the role of a num-
ber of key individuals, particularly Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar and 
Foreign Minister Lennart Meri, in the process of the monopolization of 
foreign policy by the state, and the underlining historical representations. 
Thus, the notion of a critical juncture allows us to employ “method-
ological individualism” in our focus on the backgrounds, identities and 
interests of the key players in the rivalry over Estonian foreign policy. It 
is through these individuals that the competition of ideas about Estonia’s 
history, and history’s meaning for the present, were played out. It was even-
tually through these individuals that ideas had an impact on key events 
and the development of institutions. Using Michael Mann’s adaptation of 
a metaphor by Max Weber, ideas were not merely “switchmen” at railway 
junctions that direct actors to pre-laid paths, but “tracklayers” that made 
9  The suspension of state building until after August 1991 explains the sending of mixed 
signals, intentionally or not, to the Russian minority. See Timofey Agarin, A cat’s lick: 
democratisation and minority communities in the post-Soviet Baltic (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2010), 88–92. The suspension of state building also explains the difficulties encountered 
with the Russian government already in 1992, most importantly over the citizenship 
laws. See Juhan Värk, Venemaa positiivse hõlvamise poliitika ja teiste välispoliitiliste 
liinide mõjud Eesti-Vene suhetele aastail 1991–2011, PhD thesis (Tallinn University of 
Technology, 2012), 56–60.
10  Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The study of critical junctures: theory, 
narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism”, World Politics, 59:3 (2007), 
341–369.
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social action possible.11 As John A. Hall has noted, the most dramatic way 
ideas can change social reality is arguably through their ability to lay tracks 
for the formation of new identities that have the capacity to link people 
across space. Ideas can thus create new communities of people with shared 
beliefs and interests. Historically, Hall observes, intellectuals have had the 
greatest potential to exert such “ideological power”.12 We may indeed find 
a disproportionate number of intellectuals among the key actors who led 
the revolution in Estonia in 1987–91. Savisaar and Meri were such actors.
Why focus on historical imagination in analyzing foreign policy? First, 
it is a widely shared belief among researchers within history and political 
and social studies that the political arguments of the national movements 
in the Baltic Soviet Republics were firmly rooted in historical conscious-
ness and imagination, national narratives and the restoration of suppressed 
cultural memory. In the 1980s, official Soviet historiography had to face 
up to growing suspicion and resistance from intellectuals and the public 
at large, which stemmed from orally preserved memories and nationalist 
counter-histories.13 Secondly, we agree with scholars who assume a consti-
tutive link between collective identity, understood through references to 
historical discursive practices, and security and foreign policy.14 Therefore, 
in order to pursue a credible foreign policy, government ministers need 
to construct and articulate a blueprint within a relatively stable discursive 
framework, underpinned by a few core narratives (foundational myths) 
about the nation and the state.15 These narratives are constitutive elements 
of collective self-identifications and therefore of interests.
Hence, we think that the struggle to identify Estonian interests in the 
international arena was closely interrelated with debates over history. 
Indeed, as discourses are tied up with questions of power, those debates 
amounted to a competition for discursive hegemony, meaning the power 
11  John A. Hall, “Ideas and Social Sciences”, Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institu-
tions, and political change, ed. by Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 48–51.
12  Ibid.
13  Cynthia S. Kaplan, “Setting the political agenda: cultural discourse in the Estonian 
tradition”, Empire to nation: historical perspectives on the making of the modern world, 
ed. by Joseph Esherick, Hasan Kayah, Eric van Young (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2006), 342; Pertti Grönholm, “Nostalgian ja utopian välissä: historiallisen tiedon käyttö 
ja tehtävät Viron jälleenitsenäistymisen kamppailuissa vuosina 1987–1991”, Historial-
linen aikakauskirja, 2 (2012), 175–176. 
14  Mälksoo, The politics of becoming European (2010), 55. 
15  Ole Wæver, “Identity, communities and foreign policy: discourse analysis as foreign 
policy theory”, European integration and national identity: the challenge of the Nordic 
states, ed. by Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2002), 33–34.
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to not only interpret the past, but also future events. Furthermore, as each 
sovereign state needs to have a single, coherent foreign policy, it is una-
voidable that a state sanctions a particular version of the nation’s past. The 
state in fact creates an official history that becomes the basis of sovereign 
diplomacy.16 Because historical imagination underlines much of the argu-
mentation on key foreign-policy issues, history must be identified as the 
“key organizing principle” in the construction of foreign policy.17 In the 
next section we will look more closely at the struggles over the interpreta-
tion of Estonia’s past and the political implications thereof.
The main body of primary sources consulted during our research con-
sists of statements, interviews, writings, speeches and the published mem-
oirs of leading political actors within Estonian national movements, includ-
ing Edgar Savisaar, Lennart Meri, Marju Lauristin, Mart Laar, Trivimi 
Velliste, Endel Lippmaa. Selected commentaries and interviews with other 
Estonian contemporaries have also been consulted.
Restorers versus reformers 
The crucial question for the development of Estonian foreign policy between 
1988 and 1991 was whether the country would become a reformed post-
Soviet republic that retained some of its Soviet-era institutions and tra-
ditions, or a restored republic that would seek to shed (or deny) its Soviet 
past by claiming continuity with the state that existed before 1940. It was 
on this very issue that the Estonian national movement split into two com-
peting camps in 1988, at the time when it began to emerge from the under-
ground and take organizational forms.18 This cleavage was not based on 
16  This has been stated succinctly by Hussein Banai: “State sanctioned diplomacy [...] is 
in large measure the practice of mediating state-sanctioned histories,” Hussein Banai, 
“Diplomatic imaginations: mediating estrangement in world society”, Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs, 27:3 (2014), 459–474. 
17  Tom Nijhuis, “Historical memory and the plea for a national interests based German 
foreign policy”, Czech Sociological Review, 6:2 (1998), 205–217, 206; Bernhard Stahl, “Wie 
nationale Geschichte(n) europäische Außenpolitik begründen: der Deutsche und Fran-
zösische Diskurs im Kosovo-Krieg und in der Irak-Krise”, Zweite Offene Sektionstagung 
Internationale Politik der DVPW, Darmstadt (2007), 1–31. 
18  Vello Pettai, Framing the past as future: the power of legal restorationism in Estonia, 
unpublished PhD thesis (Columbia University, 2004). Despite the existing differences, 
we accept the view that restorers and reformers, as well as nationally-minded com-
munists, can be viewed as belonging to an overarching Estonian national movement. 
See Aili Aarelaid-Tart and Hank Johnston, “Generations, microcohorts, and long-term 
mobilization: the Estonian national movement, 1940–1991”, Sociological Perspectives, 
43:4 (2000), 671–698. 
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ethnic divisions, but rather on how people related to their shared past and 
personal life experiences under the Soviet system (we do not consider the 
pro-Union groups, who were mostly composed of immigrants of the later 
decades of the Soviet period).19 
The early phase of the so-called Singing Revolution (1988–89) was 
the apotheosis of unity within the Estonian national movement, as most 
nationally-minded groups were gathered under the umbrella of the Popu-
lar Front (hereafter PF). The PF brought together environmental activists, 
nationally-minded members of the Communist Party of Estonia (Eesti-
maa Kommunistlik Partei, hereafter CPE), economic experts working on 
the program of economic self-management (Isemajandav Eesti, hereafter 
IME), heritage preservationists and many other groups. However, the highly 
emotional wave that was most visibly manifested in mass rallies and rock 
concerts did not defuse interpersonal frictions nor did it eradicate funda-
mental differences within national revolutionary thinking.20
We discern two ideal-type groups when generalizing on the experi-
ences and key choices of people under the Soviet system. On the one side, 
there were people who perceived recent Soviet past as a period of illegal, 
corrupt and criminal rule by foreign occupiers assisted by local collabo-
rators.21 Looking back at their own lives and careers, these people – often 
dissidents and their followers – could take pride in (and draw political 
capital from) having not compromised with the occupying power and 
with their own consciences. They had not joined the Communist Party for 
career opportunities or personal gain, nor had they assisted the KGB by 
informing on colleagues and friends. These choices meant that they would 
normally not reach high positions in society and would have only limited 
experience in management and administration at the governmental level. 
The choices and experiences of dissidents encapsulated the extreme wing 
of this group, as the majority of the population never went from passive 
resistance to actively opposing the Soviet regime, which almost invariably 
led to repression against the individuals concerned.22 
19  The best study of the mostly Russian-speaking minorities is Agarin, A cat’s lick.
20  Marju Lauristin, Punane ja sinine: peatükke kirjutamata elulooraamatust. Valik 
artikleid ja intervjuusid 1970–2009 (Tallinn: Eesti Ajalehed, 2010), 125–126.
21  For an interesting view of the dilemmas facing Soviet citizens and the choices of dis-
sidents, see “A transcript of a conversation between Rein Taagepera and ERSP in Tartu on 
December 28, 1988”. The document is located at the Estonian National Archives [hereafter 
RA] ERAF.9601.1.99. We were able to consult a copy sent to us by Rein Taagepera, with 
the permission of Mart Orav, editor of the journal Akadeemia. 
22  For the experience of dissidents from a generational point of view, see Aarelaid-Tart 
and Johnston, “Generations, Microcohorts”. For a typical example of an intellectual-
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In this regard, dissidents had always been marginal in the Estonian 
Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR), but since 1987 they were able to emerge 
from the underground and inspire large sections of the public. By 1990 
they had organized a mass movement, the Congress of Estonia, which 
they established with the goal of restoring the pre-1940 Estonian Republic 
on the basis of legal continuity and the doctrine of non-recognition of the 
Soviet occupation that had been upheld by most Western countries since 
1940. This discourse was focused on narratives of a Golden Age before the 
Second World War and the status of Estonians as victims of Soviet repres-
sion. There were also strong religious undertones. Furthermore, they framed 
their movement around a narrative that highlighted how Estonians were 
being turned into a minority in their own country through a policy of mass 
immigration that had been encouraged by the Soviet authorities. Thus, this 
discourse was directed at an uncompromising negation of Soviet reality.23 
Cynthia S. Kaplan has called this group “radical restorers”.24 Between 
1988 and 1990, they formed three proto-parties: the Estonian Independ-
ence Party (Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei, hereafter EIP), the Esto-
nian Heritage Society (Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts, hereafter EHS) and the 
Estonian Christian Union (Eesti Kristliku Liit). These groups not only acted 
as the main challengers to Soviet rule (including the CPE) but also to the 
“moderate reformers” of the PF. The most notable figures at the time were 
Tunne Kelam of the EIP and Trivimi Velliste of the EHS, but they were 
soon challenged by activists from the younger generation, especially those 
associated with the Young Tartu Circle (students interested in history and 
heritage) and Walhalla (socially active students) at the University of Tartu 
in the 1980s.25 The restorers based their vision of the future on the idea that 
the Baltic republics were not legally part of the USSR and therefore could 
dissident who had been dismissed from his academic job and ended up working as a 
nightwatchman, see Tunne Kelam, Eluloointervjuu: valik artikleid ja esinemisi (Tallinn: 
SE & JS, 1999).
23  The best documentary collection of the Congress of Estonia is Eesti Kongress: siis ja 
praegu, ed. by Eve Pärnaste (Tallinn: Riigikantselei: SE & JS, 2000). For the views of 
professional historians, see Meike Wulf and Pertti Grönholm, “Generating meaning 
across generations: the role of historians in the codification of history in Soviet and 
post-Soviet Estonia”, Journal of Baltic Studies, 41:3 (2010), 351–382. For an example of 
historical narratives on the Republic of Estonia between 1918–40, see the highly influential 
Mart Laar, Lauri Vahtre, Heiki Valk, Kodu lugu, II (Tallinn: Perioodika, 1989). Also see 
a critical commentary of the volume: Evald Laasi, “Ühest ebaõnnestunud ajalooalasest 
väljaandest (M. Laar, L. Vahtre, H. Valk. Kodu lugu, II)”, Vikerkaar, 6 (1990), 86.
24  Kaplan, “Setting the political agenda”, 342.
25  Tartu tudengid kuumadel kaheksakümnendatel: almanahh 2015, ed. by Ivo Rull (Tal-
linn: Rull & Rumm, 2015).
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not be expected to secede from the Soviet Union. Their campaign for jus-
tice was focused on establishing the truth about the Molotov–Ribbentrop 
Pact (hereafter MRP) of 1939, which they claimed led to the annexation of 
the Baltic states in 1940. They hoped that international recognition of this 
historic wrong would lead to – or at least greatly facilitate – the restoration 
of independence. Their use of historical knowledge and narratives was thus 
politically motivated. In August 1987 they began to organize demonstra-
tions framed around the MRP and to start the so-called calendar demon-
strations marking important national anniversaries, such as the signing 
of the Estonian-Soviet Peace Treaty in 1920.
As a result of the historical-legalist view of Estonia’s past, the Congress 
of Estonia opposed the reformist agenda of the PF, on the grounds that any 
attempt to reform the Soviet system would only legitimize existing Soviet 
institutions. The reforms of the ESSR, including those of the government 
of Edgar Savisaar after April 1990, were viewed suspiciously as efforts to 
camouflage the continuation of an unlawful occupation. The Congress of 
Estonia criticized, for example, the restoration of the blue-black-white tri-
color as the official flag of the ESSR.26
On the other side of the political divide were the “reformers”, who 
had made “compromises” in order to make advances in the social hierar-
chy of Estonian society.27 A clean political record was necessary in order 
to reach higher positions in government, the administration or in man-
agement. These roles also demanded membership in the CPE or at least 
political loyalty. Social and economic benefits, such as receiving a new 
apartment or car buying permits, also depended on having a clean politi-
cal slate. Acquiring permission to travel abroad was sometimes linked to 
official orders to report on fellow-travelers or acquaintances in a foreign 
country. Lennart Meri’s record was tainted, for example, when it became 
known that he reported to the KGB after traveling abroad, even though 
these reports did not implicate any individuals.28 The cultural elites were 
well-off in the Soviet system, but their artistic freedom was limited to what 
26  The speech delivered by Trivimi Velliste at a ceremony marking the 71st anniversary 
of the founding of the Republic of Estonia, 24 February 1989, Muinsuskaitse Seltsi 
Sõnumid, 3 (March 1989).
27  Alec Nove, “Is there a ruling class in the USSR?”, Europe-Asia Studies, 27:4 (1975), 
615–638; Alec Nove, “The class nature of the Soviet Union revisited”, Europe-Asia Stud-
ies, 35:3 (1983), 298–312.
28  For a view that Meri was essentially collaborating with the regime, see Indrek Jürjo, 
Pagulus ja Nõukogude Eesti: vaateid KGB, EKP ja VEKSA arhiividokumentide põhjal 
(Tallinn: UMARA, 1996), 280. 
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was deemed ideologically permissible. Indeed, most people had tried to 
manage their lives as best as they could and this also meant going against 
their own conscience – even if this only meant bribing officials or shout-
ing slogans at official demonstrations – and for this reason there was a lot 
of cynicism and little genuine sympathy for the self-inflicted sufferings of 
dissidents. Because of the instinct of staying on the safe side, this group, 
a loose one admittedly, would choose moderate forms of political activ-
ism that did not court danger and immediate repression by the regime.29 
The PF, formed in 1988, was perceived by most Estonians as a safe form 
of activism. The organization was founded and steered by the younger cad-
res of the CPE, along with some well-established liberal figures from the 
Estonian cultural elites. The PF, led by Edgar Savisaar, Marju Lauristin, Peet 
Kask, Heinz Valk, Mati Hint and others, initially welcomed perestroika, 
as they perceived that it was necessary to support Gorbachev’s reform ini-
tiative as a means to escape the “suffocating stagnation” of Soviet life.30 
The reformists called for greater economic autonomy and an ethnically 
non-exclusive form of democracy, but did not aim for full independence 
before 1989. A number of leading figures in the PF belonged to the “gen-
eration of the 1960s”, who had experienced the temporary liberalization 
of cultural life in the Baltic SSRs. They were left bitterly disappointed by 
the suppression of the freedom of expression and the overall cultural and 
economic stagnation under Brezhnev. Many felt that perestroika marked a 
second wave of the thaw of the 1950s–60s.31 This was the post-war genera-
tion that had secured positions inside academia, the local administration 
and the CPE. They had experienced personal success and had memories 
that made it difficult for them to simply write off the Soviet period as a 
gross mistake.32 Their vision of the Estonian future was a mix of moderate 
reform politics and ideas about an open future, including a wide variety of 
29  Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet state 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 166–178, on dissidents see pages 70–72.
30  Kaarel Piirimäe’s interview with Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm, 13 August 
2015 (in authors’ possession).
31  Such was the opinion of Edgar Savisaar, who considered himself part of the 1960s 
generation. See Edgar Savisaar, Revolutsioon jätkub (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1988), 
41–56. Savisaar presented perestroika as a renewal of the efforts of reform that had been 
blocked in 1964. See also Rein Veidemann, “Kuuekümnendate põlvkond Eesti kultuuris 
ja ühiskonnas”, Sirp, 27 September 1991; Rein Raudvere, “Rahvarinne viis vene tankide 
hirmu”, Maaleht, 17 August 2008, Lauristin, Punane ja sinine, 322–323. 
32  For an example of someone who was able to adapt to the Soviet system, at least 
partially, see Hindrek-Peeter Meri, Tagasivaateid veerevast vagunist (Tartu: Ilmamaa, 
2008). H.-P. Meri (b. 1934) was the younger brother of Lennart Meri and devoted the 
best part of his life to improving the Soviet system. 
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societal models that ranged from liberal state socialism (Hungary) to the 
Nordic welfare state (Finland, Sweden, etc.).
In 1988 the PF was unquestionably the leading reform-minded organ-
ization. However, the following year the restorers conceived a form of 
mobilization that allowed them to become a serious rival. In early 1989 
they began to form citizen committees to register citizens of the pre-1940 
republic and their descendants, including those from the Estonian dias-
pora. The unique campaign of registering citizens of a de jure existing state 
proved immensely popular, as it turned into a symbolic referendum against 
the Soviet occupation and also promised to exclude Soviet-era immigrants 
from future decisions on the constitution of the state.33 On Independence 
Day on 24 February 1990, registered citizens had the opportunity to elect a 
parliament, the Congress of Estonia, which allegedly represented the true 
will of the Estonian nation. Elections were timed to forestall elections to a 
new Supreme Soviet in March. Some even claimed that the Supreme Soviet 
had become redundant.34 A similar congress came into being in Latvia.35
The success of the Estonian committees thus placed the PF on the horns 
of a dilemma. Edgar Savisaar, the PF’s leader, viewed the restorationist and 
nostalgic goal of returning to a Golden Age as unrealistic (more on this 
below), but more importantly he was also concerned about losing his power 
base. Savisaar could either try to ignore the challenge of the Congress and 
focus on winning a majority in the coming elections to the Supreme Soviet, 
which was still the legal parliament according to existing Soviet law, or try 
to use his popularity to gain a position of influence within the Congress. 
Eventually, he decided in favor of the second option. However, because of 
his own procrastination the candidates of the PF had insufficient time to 
campaign and therefore did not gain enough seats to control the Congress. 
Subsequently, the Congress posed a serious challenge to Savisaar’s author-
ity once he became Prime Minister in April 1990.
33  On the start of citizens’ registration, see Eesti Kongress, 27–31. Those immigrants 
who had declared a desire to become citizens of an independent Estonia could take 
part in the Congress of Estonia as non-voting members. See “Eesti Kongressi statuut ja 
kodukord”, Eesti Kongress, 287.
34  Trivimi Velliste, “Miks ilma Ülemnõukoguta?”, Muinsuskaitse Seltsi Sõnumid, Febru-
ary 1990; Rein Taagepera in Eesti Ekspress, 9 March 1990. Latvians elected their Supreme 
Soviet on the same day, 18 March. Lithuanian elections had taken place on 24 February 
and had resulted in the Lithuanian declaration of independence on 11 March.
35  Eduards Bruno Deksnis, Tālavs Jundzis, The parliamentary route to the restoration 
of Latvian statehood, 1989–1993 (Riga: Latvian Academy of Sciences, Baltic Centre for 
Strategic Studies, 2010), 61–63.
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It is important to note, however, that despite their differences over his-
torical interpretation, both the reformists and radical restorers needed 
each other. According to Lauristin’s analysis of July 1991, each bloc actu-
ally benefited from the competition.36
Persons and institutions: competition over foreign policy
The newly-elected Supreme Soviet convened on 29 March 1990. It was the 
first democratic parliament of Estonia since the Second World War.37 It 
immediately announced the beginning of a transition to full independ-
ence. This initiative fell short of declaring full independence, as Lithuania 
had done earlier in the same month. Savisaar’s cabinet promptly insti-
gated intense diplomatic activities abroad. Foreign Minister Lennart Meri 
was responsible for diplomatic operations in the West, while Endel Lipp-
maa, known as the “Minister of the East”, was to negotiate with the Soviet 
Union. The goal was to talk to Moscow on an equal footing, as a sovereign 
state on the basis of the Treaty of Tartu of 1920.38 Savisaar became a vis-
ible figure on the international stage, alongside Arnold Rüütel, the Chair-
man of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (a post comparable with the 
office of the president).
Yet, Savisaar’s cabinet lacked the legitimacy that is taken for granted in 
established democracies, as this was regarded as a time of transition that 
was supposed to result in a transfer of power to legitimate institutions of a 
restored Republic.39 The Congress of Estonia convened between 11–12 March 
and discussed declaring itself the supreme authority in Estonia. Fearing 
the use of force by Moscow, however, it stepped back from such a move and 
consequently operated as a kind of shadow parliament in opposition. Some 
36  Asta Niinemets: “Elus juhtub täpselt see, mis juhtub”, Postimees, 24 July 24 1991, 
Lauristin, Punane ja sinine, 316. However, in a 1993 interview Lauristin noted that in 
the spring of 1990 she had been deeply worried about the strong antagonisms within 
the Estonian national movement and called for a mutual approach and consensus. See 
Kalle Muuli, “Marju Lauristin ei taha ajaratast tagasi pöörata”, Postimees, 20 August 
1993, Lauristin, Punane ja sinine, 321.
37  It is questionable, however, whether the Soviet garrison troops, who could also send 
their representatives to the Supreme Soviet, followed the democratic procedure.
38  “Eesti NSV kõigi tasandite rahvasaadikute täiskogu deklaratsioon riikliku 
iseseisvuse küsimuses”, February 2, 1990; <https://vp2001-2006.president.ee/et/
ametitegevus/?gid=72919> (accessed 13 June 2016). “Otsus Eesti Vabariigi Ülemnõu-
kogu tegevusprogrammist üleminekuperioodil Eesti Vabariigi iseseisvuse taastamiseni 
ja valitsemise ajutisest korrast”, 16 May 1990, <http://estlex.com/tasuta/index.php?id=8
&aktid=2899&asutus=23&fd=1&grupp=1&leht=12> (accessed 13 June 2016).
39  Lauristin and Vihalemm, Return to the Western world, 95.
489Piirimäe, Grönholm: Historical consciousness, personal life experiences
members of the Congress were also elected to the Supreme Soviet; this group 
became an important lever vis-à-vis the political balance in parliament.40 
The historical-legalistic idea that the Congress of Estonia was the only 
legitimate organ that could represent Estonian citizens meant that the body 
was determined to have its own representation in international affairs. The 
Estonian Committee, the Congress’s executive organ, therefore included a 
commission for external affairs. According to archival documents preserved 
at the Estonian National Library, it was supposed to formulate positions 
on foreign-policy, co-ordinate domestically with other political organiza-
tions, represent the Congress abroad and develop contacts with foreign 
governments and “other powerful circles”. This entailed quasi-diplomatic 
activities on the international stage. The other important area of activi-
ties was in regard to the Soviet Union. This was primarily focused on the 
management of relations with the central authorities in Moscow, but also 
with the emerging democratic opposition movements in Russia. Contacts 
with the other Soviet republics were also a priority, but most important 
was engaging with Latvia and Lithuania in order to maintain a common 
positions vis-à-vis Mikhail Gorbachev.41 
The Committee’s desire to co-operate with the PF was shown in their 
attempt to co-opt their leaders. Indeed, the Committee’s external affairs 
commission included almost all of the key figures in Savisaar’s govern-
ment: Savisaar, Lennart Meri, Endel Lippmaa, Marju Lauristin and Ülo 
Nugis, who would become head of the negotiating team with Gorbachev. 
The commission’s composition anticipated the division of responsibilities 
in Savisaar’s cabinet, with Lippmaa being responsible for relations with 
the East and Meri with the West.42 
Savisaar was elected Prime Minister on 3 April 1990, and the follow-
ing week his ministers were elected to office one-by-one by the Supreme 
Soviet according to the old Soviet tradition. Foreign Minister Meri failed to 
gain the support of the foreign commission of the Supreme Soviet, which 
expressed its concern about the candidate’s competence.43 According to the 
law of the ESSR government, enacted on 6 December 1989, the chairman 
40  Eesti Kongress, 72, 302.
41  Eesti Rahvusraamatukogu (National Library of Estonia, hereafter RR), 2.1.148: Com-
missions of the Estonian Committee, Archive of the Congress of Estonia 1989–1992. It has 
to be noted that the impact of the Estonian Committee in international affairs seemed 
to be negligible and largely limited to co-operating with the Estonian diaspora abroad. 
42  RR, 2.1.107: 3rd meeting of the Estonian Committee, March 23, 1990, Eesti Komitee 
istungite protokollid 1–3.
43  Alatalu, “Eesti välispoliitiline kontseptsioon”, 90. 
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of the government could not dismiss ministers without the consent of the 
Supreme Soviet. This led to the awkward situation of the prime minister 
having to work with ministers he did not trust, but who enjoyed the sup-
port of parliament.44 
The relatively weak position of the prime minister vis-à-vis powerful 
ministries, which often had strong vested interests, partly explains the 
lack of co-ordination in policies, including foreign affairs. Since Savisaar 
only became prime minister with the help of the votes controlled by the 
Congress (Mart Laar, Kaido Kama, Illar Hallaste, etc.) in the Supreme 
Soviet, he had to build bridges with this rival organization. Indeed, the 
choice of Meri and Lippmaa reflects his desire to strengthen his cabinet 
with authoritative figures across the political divide.45 Lippmaa had been 
elected a member of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress, while Lennart 
Meri had been elected to the Congress and to its executive Committee 
only.46 As members of the war generation, who were ten to twenty years 
older than the post-war generation, which was most active in politics (Lau-
ristin, Savisaar, Velliste), they were deemed to be above the bickering that 
beset the various factions.47
This also meant that Savisaar experienced much greater difficulties in 
controlling their work. One of Meri’s deputies, Enn Liimets, still remem-
bers Meri’s utter lack of respect for Savisaar’s wishes and instructions.48 
The same is true for Lippmaa, who would openly challenge Savisaar in the 
spring of 1991 over the government’s policies toward the considerable Rus-
sian minority in North-East Estonia.49 As a result, Savisaar had difficulties 
in coordinating the government’s work on foreign policy. Naturally he had 
no sway over the activities of the Congress, with which Savisaar came to 
an open breach in May 1990. By September 1990, the issue of monopolizing 
state diplomacy in Estonia became the subject of public concern.
44  For the case involving Jaak Tamm, the Minister of Energetics and Industry, see 
Edgar Savisaar, Peaminister: Eesti lähiajalugu 1990–1992 (Tartu: Kleio, 2004), 597–598. 
45  Mart Laar claims that Meri’s appointment as foreign minister was Congress’s condi-
tion for supporting Savisaar’s candidacy for the post of prime minister. Information 
shared by Mart Laar with Kaarel Piirimäe, Tartu, 23 September 2015.
46  Meri acknowledged having “personal difficulties” with belonging to both the PF and 
the Congress of Estonia. See Oplatka, Lennart Meri, 288.
47  On the influence of different generations, see Wulf and Grönholm, “Generating 
meaning across generations”, 371–372; Aarelaid-Tart and Johnston, “Generations, micro-
cohorts”.
48  Kaarel Piirimäe’s interviews with Enn Liimets, Kohila, 8 July 2014 and 19 November 
2014 (in the authors’ possession).
49  Tiit Kändler, Endel Lippmaa: mees parima ninaga: dokumentaalne teadusromaan 
(Tallinn: Ajakirjade Kirjastus, 2012), 254–255.
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In an affair, which the overzealous press presumptuously called the 
Estonian Watergate, President Rüütel hired a US solicitor to represent 
Estonian interests in the United States.50 The Estonian government was 
authorized by Rüütel to pay the lawyer’s office an undefined sum in the 
event of Estonia being recognized de jure by the US government. Meri ini-
tially knew nothing about the transaction. When he did find out he helped 
leak information about it to the press and fired an official in the foreign 
ministry, Kalle Tenno, who was being used as a go-between by both Rüü-
tel and Lippmaa in the United States behind Meri’s back.51 Savisaar asked 
Meri and Lippmaa to declare that they adhered to a single Estonian for-
eign policy, but the public was not convinced.52 Personal ambition and 
power struggles lay behind this lack of co-ordination, but strategic differ-
ences were also present: the desire of Rüütel and Lippmaa to gain de jure 
recognition went against the doctrine of legal continuity. In fact, the US 
government was already recognizing Estonia as a de jure state, but could 
not recognize Savisaar’s government or its plenipotentiaries as being the 
de facto government that controlled Estonian territory. From a legal point 
of view, the Savisaar administration was merely an interim authority that 
could not claim international recognition.53 
Although Lippmaa was supposed to focus on relations with the Soviet 
Union, a lack of success in Moscow induced him to turn his attention 
toward the West. As Lippmaa’s path began to cross with Meri, the foreign 
minister publicly suggested that his old friend be presented with a com-
pass.54 In November 1990, Meri and Lippmaa, who were former classmates 
and old friends, squabbled over who should sit in a chair designated for 
the Estonian minister at a meeting with the US Secretary of State, James 
Baker, in Paris. This embarrassing incident was only resolved when an 
50  The company was Donovan Leisure, Rogovin, Huge & Schiller, which had already 
worked for the government of Indrek Toome since 1989.
51  Tenno insisted that he left the ministry willingly, and that he had represented the 
present Estonian Republic, not the republic that had been occupied in 1940 and was 
represented by consul Ernst Jaakson in the United States. See “Kalle Tenno oma tege-
vusest”, Edasi, 14 December 1990.
52  “Eesti välispoliitika on ühtne,” Päevaleht, 7 October 1990; “Kes teeb Eesti välispolii-
tikat?”, Päevaleht, 7 October 1990.
53  Ernst Jaakson, Consul General of the Republic of Estonia in the United States, “Diplo-
maatiliste suhete küsimused” [A note on questions concerning diplomatic relations], 
New York, 2 April 1991, private papers of Enn Liimets in possession of Enn Liimets 
(Kohila, Estonia).
54  “Valitsuse pressikonverents”, Eesti Päevaleht, 11 November 1990.
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additional chair was brought into the room.55 Savisaar tactfully supported 
both his ministers. Lennart Meri declared that the differences were only 
tactical; his diplomacy emphasized dialogue and the search for common 
interests, while Lippmaa used legalistic arguments to exert pressure on 
foreign governments. However, Meri insisted that everyone shared the 
same basic goals.56 However, observers were not convinced and identified 
at least five different players and conceptions in contemporary Estonian 
diplomacy. Tõnu Parming, an Estonian-American scholar associated with 
the Congress of Estonia, and with close connections to the State Depart-
ment, warned that such chaos had been unimportant during Estonia’s 
isolation from world affairs, but was now becoming a serious liability. He 
highlighted how Washington officials were wondering who actually repre-
sented the country. Parming understood the difficulty of developing sov-
ereign diplomacy without an effective foreign ministry.57 
Similar perceptions were emerging in London. The lack of communi-
cation between Arnold Rüütel and Lennart Meri was noted by the Brit-
ish Foreign and Commonwealth Office in November 1990, when the two 
politicians asked to meet the British Prime Minister separately. The Brit-
ish also detected a rivalry between Savisaar and Rüütel.58
It is probably true that a crude power struggle took place during the 
process,59 but we suggest that people’s views on history and their experi-
ences of the past were initially more important to their visions and actions 
than considerations of power. In the following section we will focus on two 
individuals who exerted extensive influence on Estonia’s choices in foreign 
affairs, starting with Edgar Savisaar and continuing with Lennart Meri. 
We will analyze their views on foreign policy from the perspective of their 
life experiences and the resulting historical imaginations.
55  Recollections of Jüri Luik in Teine tulemine, 2: välisministeeriumi taasloomise lugu, 
ed. by Eeva Eek-Pajuste (Tallinn: Välisministeerium, 2008), 162.
56  “Lennart Meri kompetentsi piiridest välispoliitikas”, Edasi, 20 December 1990.
57  “Eesti välispoliitikas viis erinevat liini”, Eesti Päevaleht, 22 September 1990. In 
September, Parming identified five players: Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar, ministers 
Lennart Meri, Endel Lippmaa, Arnold Rüütel and Ülo Nugis (Chairman of the Estonian 
Supreme Soviet and leader of a delegation conducting negotiations with Moscow). He 
also highlighted the role of the Congress of Estonia.
58  George Edgar, Soviet department, brief about Lennart Meri’s visit to the UK on 4–7 
November 1990, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, documents released under the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 request no. 0122-16 (Kaarel Piirimäe). 
59  David J. Smith, Artis Pabriks, Aldis Purs and Thomas Lane, The Baltic states: Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania (London: Routledge, 2002), 71 (Thomas Lane citing Riina Kionka).
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Edgar Savisaar. History and foreign policy
Edgar Savisaar was born in 1950 in a prison into an Estonian family who 
were enduring long sentences for resisting Stalin-era collectivization.60 
As with most young careerists of the post-war generation, Savisaar was 
active in the Komsomol, the communist youth organization. He gradu-
ated with a history degree from the University of Tartu and worked as a 
history teacher between 1973 and 1976. In 1980 he completed a candidate 
of sciences degree with a dissertation on the socio-philosophical basis of 
the work of the Club of Rome.61 From 1982, Savisaar worked as a docent 
(associate professor) at the Academy of Sciences of the ESSR, whilst also 
forging an administrative career in the Tallinn district authorities and 
continuing to undertake party work for the Komsomol. Between 1985 and 
1988 he acted as the head of department at the State Planning Committee 
(Gosplan) of the ESSR. He then became director of research at Mainor, the 
first consulting company in the USSR. Mainor became a unique center of 
progressive economic and social thought and management in the Soviet 
Union.62 At the time, Savisaar was already active in politics, organizing 
the PF and working on the IME program that he had helped to initiate in 
August 1987. In 1989 Savisaar was elected to be a member of the Congress 
of People’s Deputies of the USSR, while also holding prominent positions 
in the government of the ESSR. 
In the 1980s, Savisaar was a productive publicist, writing about the Kom-
somol, local administration and management. In a book on global problems 
and scenarios for the future he warned that symptoms of a global crisis 
were affecting capitalist and socialist systems, but emphasized that there 
were no long-term solutions within the capitalist mode of production.63 
His most notable work during this period appeared in 1988 and was on 
perestroika. The book, entitled The revolution continues, showed Savisaar 
60  Tarmo Vahter, “Avastus arhiivist: Savisaare vanemad pandi vangi, sest nad protestisid 
kolhoosi vastu”, Eesti Ekspress, 31 May 2010.
61  Edgar Savisaar, Sotsial’no-filosofskie osnovȳ rabot Rimskogo kluba po global’nomu 
modelirovaniyu: avtoreferat kandidata filosofskikh nauk (Moskovskii gosudarstvennȳi 
pedagogicheskii institut im. V. I. Lenina, 1981).
62  Mati Laos, Mainori lugu (Tallinn: Mainor, 2014). 
63  Lembit Valt, Edgar Savisaar, Globaalprobleemid ja tulevikustsenaariumid (Tallinn: 
Eesti Raamat, 1983), 26; Kalju Ots, Edgar Savisaar, Rahvasaadiku pilguga: Tallinna 
Mererajooni Rahvasaadikute Nõukogu töökogemusi (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1983); Edgar 
Savisaar, Tööviljakus. Töödistsipliin. Tööaeg (Tallinn: Valgus, 1986; Edgar Savisaar, 
Roland Vinkel, Looduskaitse ja õpilasmalev: 1985. a. läbiviidud eksperimendi tulemused 
(Tallinn: Eesti Õpilasmaleva Keskstaap, 1986); 
494 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2016, 3/4 (157/158)
to be a devotee of Gorbachev’s new thinking: a progressive Leninist fight-
ing against Stalinist “deformations”, the bureaucracy and corruption. The 
declared objective of the PF, which he launched in April 1988, was to support 
perestroika, according to Leninist principles. Thus, this initiative seems to 
have been a genuine policy strategy, as opposed to a tactical move intended 
to camouflage other aims, as has sometimes been claimed.64
Savisaar’s progressive mindset and aversion to nostalgia was already 
apparent in a speech he delivered at the founding Congress of the PF held 
between 1–2 October 1988. He positioned his movement as a centrist organ-
ization, between what he saw as the two extremes in Estonian politics: Sta-
linists and nationalists. As he wrote: “The peculiarity of Estonia is that the 
common feature of the extremes on either side is their nostalgia and their 
turn towards the past. The dreams of both [camps] are from the end of 
the 1930s.”65 As regards national “radicals”, Savisaar deplored their lack of 
understanding vis-à-vis the belief that content was more important than 
form. He wrote that they “wish in any case to restore state independence 
without realizing that national self-determination can come in very many 
forms”. Instead of independence, the PF offered sovereignty, economic self-
management, humanism and democracy.66 In Marju Lauristin’s opinion, 
The PF preferred smooth progress towards a democratic society over the 
full restoration of a historical state. In July 1991, Lauristin still considered 
this latter policy as “national romanticism”.67 At the Congress of the PF in 
1988, Hando Runnel, a prominent poet who later joined the Congress of 
Estonia, noted that the movement was half-hearted about disclosing some 
aspects of the country’s history.68
Initially, the leaders of the PF shared the same cautious approach regard-
ing the elaboration of historical narratives and arguments in politics as 
their moderate party comrades who still supported the CPE in 1988 and 
1989. For example, Jaak Allik, a renowned drama director, CPE member 
and later a member of the Supreme Soviet, saw the radical restorers as 
unrealistic dreamers and compared them to the Estonian Communists 
of the 1940s who believed in changing everything overnight. According 
64  Edgar Savisaar, Revolutsioon jätkub (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1988); Eestimaa Rahva-
rinne: harta: üldprogramm: vastu võetud Eestimaa Rahvarinde Rahvakongressil 2. okt. 
1988 (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1988).
65  Rahvakongress: Eestimaa Rahvarinde kongress 1.–2. okt. 1988: materjalide kogumik, 
ed. by J. Nõmm, A. Ottenson (Tallinn: Perioodika, 1988), 20.
66  Ibid.
67  Niinemets, “Elus juhtub täpselt see, mis juhtub”; Lauristin, Punane ja sinine, 312.
68  Lauristin, Punane ja sinine, 144.
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to Allik, the nationalist restorers dreamed of achieving their utopia by 
changing “objective facts”. He thought that both ideas were unrealistic: 
“Some want to turn the wheel of history backwards; some want to turn 
the wheel fast forward.”69 In 1987 and 1988, the CPE attacked their rivals 
several times by accusing them of “speculating with nationalist sentiment 
and historical memory”.70
In 1988, the “horizon of expectations” of the PF leaders was still domi-
nated by a vision of a future Estonia as a society that would be organized 
according to the principles of “Socialism with a human face”. According 
to Heinz Valk, the first milestone for Estonia would come when the nation 
became a sovereign socialist state that was an autonomous, but not fully 
independent.71 The PF viewed itself as the leading force in Estonia in pav-
ing the way gradually towards a realistic transition from a socialist republic 
within the USSR to a modern social-democratic society. This mindset also 
rejected the nationalistic historical imagination that inspired the nostalgic 
utopianism of the radical restorers.
By the spring of 1989, the leadership of the PF, Savisaar included, real-
ized the power of historical arguments in the struggle against Gorbachev. 
According to Lauristin, this realization gradually emerged as a result of 
contact with foreign diplomats and politicians. Subsequently, the lead-
ership came to believe that it was much more realistic to emphasize the 
uniqueness of the Baltic case, rather than to argue for the dissolution of 
the entire Soviet Union, as had hitherto been the objective of the PF. For 
tactical reasons the PF therefore turned the thesis of legal continuity, which 
had thus far been the exclusive concern of dissidents, into its main vehicle 
for achieving independence.72
On becoming a member of the Soviet Congress of Peoples’ Deputies 
in May 1989, Savisaar was the main animating force, beside the academi-
cian Endel Lippmaa, behind the effort to set up a commission to investi-
gate the secret protocols of the MRP of 1939, and to revoke the results of 
the Nazi–Soviet collaboration for the Baltic states.73 Savisaar’s energy and 
69  Jaak Allik, “Neobolševism Eestis”, Sakala, 3 June 1989.
70  Grönholm, “Nostalgian ja utopian välissä”, 179.
71  Heinz Valk, “Laulev revolutsioon”, Sirp ja vasar, 17 June 1988. 
72  Interview with Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm; Oplatka, Lennart Meri, 297. 
However, in 1991 Lauristin refuted the argument that this was a tactical move. Instead, 
she explained that the movement had needed more time to re-orientate itself. This was 
especially the case for the leaders of the PF, who finally managed to overcome the mental 
barrier erected over the question of legal continuity. See Lauristin, Punane ja sinine, 316.
73  According to Heiki Lindpere, Savisaar became the deputy chairman of the commission 
to investigate the pact. See Heiki Lindpere, The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: challenging 
496 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2016, 3/4 (157/158)
organizational talent pushed forward the work of the MRP commission 
despite obstruction by Valentin Falin, the chairman of the International 
Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, his supporters within 
the commission, and the passivity of Alexander Yakovlev, the chairman 
who was taking instructions directly from Gorbachev.74 After substantial 
pressure was exerted from Estonian and other Baltic members, Yakovlev 
finally came to their support. On 24 December 1989, the Peoples’ Congress 
passed a historic declaration that acknowledged for the first time the exist-
ence of the secret protocol and declared it legally null and void.75 
As the Baltic states saw it, the decision of the Congress had opened the 
door to a restoration of independence. The idea of state continuity had been 
made part of Estonian law. On 12 November 1989 the Supreme Soviet of 
the ESSR declared that the country was an occupied and annexed state.76 
On 2 February 1990 it announced its intention to start negotiations with 
Moscow on the basis of the legal validity of the Treaty of Tartu of 1920, and 
on 30 March 1990 it announced the beginning of the process for restoring 
full sovereign status to the Republic.77 However, even after becoming prime 
Soviet history (Tallinn: Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 2009), 21. According to Keiji 
Sato, he was just an ordinary member. See Keiji Sato, “The Molotov-Ribbentrop com-
mission and claims of post-Soviet secessionist territories to sovereignty”, Demokrati-
zatsiya, 18:2 (2010), 148–159, 149. For Soviet falsifications concerning the history of the 
MRP more generally, see Jan Lipinsky, “Reception and historiography of the MRP in 
(Soviet) Russia – historians and their responsibility”, draft article in authors’ posses-
sion, due to appear in 2017.
74  Lindpere, Challenging Soviet history, 23–25, 30–31, 35, 39. This is confirmed indirectly 
by Yakovlev, who refers to Baltic positions as “extremely radical”. See A. N. Yakovlev, 
Sumerki (Moscow: Materik, 2003), 419. Yakovlev was probably misled by Gorbachev’s 
decision to withhold existing documents from the public, ibid., 422. According to Sato, 
Savisaar repeatedly pleaded with members of the commission for them not to link the 
MRP to the question of the secession of the republics. See Sato, “The Molotov-Ribbentrop 
commission”, 152. This may have been a tactical move.
75  Sato, “The Molotov-Ribbentrop commission”. The declaration fell short of linking 
the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact to the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states in 1940, as 
Gorbachev insisted on limiting the commission’s mandate to investigating the events 
of 1939. In the circumstances, the decision of 24 December 1989 was probably the best 
outcome the Baltic delegates could achieve. It has to be noted that even Yakovlev, 
ostensibly a liberal, could not accept the link between the MRP and the annexation of 
the Baltic states. See Alexander Jakowlew, Offener Schluss: ein Reformer zieht Bilanz 
(Leipzig: Kiepenheuer, 1992), 111.
76  At this time, even the communist party had accepted the occupation as a fact, “EKP 
Keskkomitee büroo avaldus seoses 1940. aasta sündmustega Eestis”, Poliitika, 7 (1990), 
2–3.
77  Valikkogumik Eesti NSV Ülemnõukogu XI koosseisu poolt vastuvõetud seadusandlikest 
aktidest (Tallinn, 1990), 63–64, 88–89; “Constitutional status of Estonia”, Riigi Teataja, 
29 March 1990.
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minister in April 1990, Savisaar seemed to consider state continuity as a 
straightjacket that needlessly limited his freedom of maneuver, despite the 
declarations and decrees of the Supreme Soviet of the ESSR.
Even while working to secure condemnation of the MRP in the fall of 
1989, Savisaar’s legal advisers developed the concept of the “third repub-
lic”. According to this theory, which was fashioned as a counter move 
against the challenge of the Citizens’ Committees, the pre-war republic 
could not be restored, but it was possible and more advantageous to cre-
ate a new state. The third republic, according to Savisaar, not only had to 
incorporate pre-war traditions, but also had to take advantage of the intel-
lectual and material capital accumulated during the Soviet period.78 The 
concept clearly had supporters in Estonian society, most of all among the 
nomenklatura,79 but it had no chance of success in public discourse. Indeed, 
Savisaar never raised it again after 1989,80 but the banner raised suspicions 
and was subsequently actively used by political opponents.81 According 
to Lauristin, during the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991 some 
radical restorers were still afraid that the Estonian Supreme Soviet would 
issue a proclamation announcing a “third republic”.82
Savisaar intentionally fuelled these suspicions by criticizing historical 
continuity in several public appearances. This was evident, for example, 
in a speech he delivered in June 1990 in commemoration of Carl Robert 
Jakobson, a hero of the period of National Awakening in the nineteenth 
century. In clearly identifying with this iconic figure, Savisaar claimed 
that Jakobson “had no abstract notion of Estonianness de jure; Estonia – 
this meant having two feet on the ground”.83 Invoking deeply engrained 
symbols and stereotypes from Estonian history, Savisaar was presenting 
himself as a proponent of realism, while implying that his opposition was 
naively clinging to the nostalgic idea of returning to a distant wonderland. 
78  Savisaar developed these ideas on Estonian Radio, which were later published in Reede, 
22 September 1989. Also see the article by the lawyer Jüri Põld, “Kolmanda Vabariigi 
sünd”, Edasi, 21 September 1989.
79  For instance, Bruno Saul, the chairman of the council of ministers from 1984 to 1988, 
supported this view. See Bruno Saul, Meie aeg (Tallinn: Maalehe raamat, 2006), 57–58. 
According to Marju Lauristin, Indrek Toome also liked the third-republic idea. This 
opinion was expressed in an interview with Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm.
80  Kaarel Piirimäe’s interview with Rein Taagepera, Tartu, 14 May 2015 (in the authors’ 
possession); Lauristin, Punane ja sinine, 95. 
81  RR, 2.1.57, l. 53–60: The speech delivered by Tunne Kelam at the 4th Congress of 
Estonia, 16 March 1991.
82  Lauristin, Punane ja sinine, 137.
83  “Speech [delivered] on Victory Day, 23 June 1990, at Kurgja Mansion at the grave of 
Carl Robert Jakobson”, Edgar Savisaar, Kõned (Tallinn: Olion, 1990), 62–63. 
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It should be noted that Jakobson had been charged as expressing pro-Rus-
sian feelings by the younger generation.84
There were ample grounds for suspecting that the formation of a third 
republic remained Savisaar’s preferred option. The idea of legal continuity 
proved useful in the arguments of those seeking to regain independence, 
but the more practical aspects of the idea – the restitution of property to 
former owners and the denial of citizenship rights to post-1940 immi-
grants, etc. – were difficult for him to accept. As regards property reform, 
Savisaar has explained that his hesitance was a result of his unwillingness 
to open up the wounds that had been inflicted on Estonian villages during 
the Soviet nationalization drives of the 1940s and the 1950s. This process 
affected his own family deeply.85 
Savisaar’s foreign-policy initiatives were plagued by opposition fears 
that he would make too many concessions to the Soviet Union or Russia. 
The first conflict emerged over the government’s effort to take control of 
Estonia’s borders, establishing a so-called “economic border” with Russia. 
The problem for the Congress of Estonia was that this border followed the 
de facto border delineated by Stalin in 1944–45, and not the de jure demar-
cation lines established by the Treaty of Tartu in 1920, thus compromis-
ing the principle of restitutio ad integrum. It was clear from the Commit-
tee’s announcement regarding the question that it was concerned about 
Savisaar’s government being able to achieve international recognition 
on the grounds that it was now able to control its territory as a sovereign 
state.86 According to the Committee, this turn of events would only legiti-
mize a regime that was still essentially an occupying administration. The 
Committee also deplored Savisaar’s deal with the Ministry of the Interior 
of the USSR – the so-called Savisaar-Bakatin Agreement – about transfer-
ring authority over the police force to the ESSR, and also the payment of 
84  Mart Laar remembers a tribunal organized by the student group “Young-Tartu”, 
which charged C. R. Jakobson with pro-Russianness, whilst exonerating Jakob Hurt, 
who was closer to the Baltic Germans. See Mart Laar, Pööre: mälestusi I (Tallinn: Read, 
2015), 16. Savisaar developed the habit of putting on the robes of historical figures, 
comparing himself to Konstantin Päts, for example, in the fall of 1990 and even to Jaan 
Tõnisson in early 1992.
85  Savisaar, Peaminister, 334. Savisaar’s principle advisor on privatization at the time, 
Erik Terk, has explained the relative slowness of reforms in the sector by outlining 
a number of objective factors. See Erik Terk, Privatization in Estonia: ideas, process, 
results (Tallinn: Estonian Institute for Future Studies, 2000), 41–51; Erik Terk to Kaarel 
Piirimäe, Tallinn, 12 October 2015.
86  RR, 2.1.111, p. 250: Kokkuvõte Eesti Komitee istungi protokollist nr. 25. 27 September 
1990; 2.1.111, p. 257: Eesti Komitee koosoleku märgukiri piirikontrolli kohta. 
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taxes to the USSR.87 The committee also protested about Savisaar’s letter 
to Senator Alan Dixon of the US Congress, in which the prime minister 
had ostensibly requested diplomatic recognition.88 
In retrospect, it is difficult to contemplate what else Savisaar could have 
done in the circumstances to assert Estonia’s sovereignty: to take control 
of Estonian territory and negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet institutions. 
Trivimi Velliste, one of the leaders of the Congress of Estonia, later acknowl-
edged that from the point of view of practical day-to-day decisions, no 
neat line could be drawn between seceding from the USSR and restoring 
independence: “eventually, you had to establish some sort of ministries, 
etc. You needed to control the borders, even if it was not clear where the 
border exactly ran.”89 
Some other former critics and opponents are less sympathetic. Mart 
Nutt, a rising star in the foreign ministry under Lennart Meri, claims that 
Savisaar wished to sign a new union treaty to stay in the Soviet Union and 
even conspired to associate Estonia with the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States after the dissolution of the USSR.90 Marju Lauristin, an ally of 
Savisaar at the time, dismisses such allegations as fantasy. Nevertheless, 
she notes that “Savisaar had and still has an Eastern European habitus” in 
the bourdieusque sense. As opposed to Meri, he felt much more comfort-
able travelling in the East than in the West, and Savisaar had adopted the 
paradigm, popular among many Western Sovietologists, that “the [Soviet] 
system could be developed in a better way”.91
Indeed, in his memoirs Savisaar is quite candid about his skepticism 
toward the Western capitalist model.92 In December 1991, he delivered 
a speech at the Congress of Future Estonia in which he argued that the 
Western “market mechanism” provided no solution to global problems 
and had failed as a long-term strategy. This was very much in the spirit of 
his 1983 book on global problems. Savisaar further warned against trying 
to copy the Western trajectory of development and suggested that Esto-
nia should try to achieve Western standards of living without giving up 
87  RR, 2.1.112, l. 157: Eesti Komitee poliitiline avaldus, 1 November 1990. On the Savi-
saar–Bakatin agreement, see Savisaar, Peaminister, 300–309.
88  RR, 2.1.115, l. 44: Eesti Komitee märgukiri Eesti riikluse alustest, 21 February 1991.
89  Kaarel Piirimäe’s interview with Trivimi Velliste, Tartu, 14 January 2015 (in the 
authors’ possession).
90  Interview of Kaarel Piirimäe and Holger Mölder with Mart Nutt, Tallinn, 6 April 
2015 (in the authors’ possession). 
91  Interview with Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm.
92  Savisaar, Peaminister, 789–795.
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its own system of values. The most effective model, according to Savisaar, 
was an elitist, centralized system like that of Japan, which would offer a 
short-cut towards higher living standards without needing to accept the 
high social and environmental costs.93 Moreover, Estonia would remain 
associated with the Soviet Union in some form – if only to help the West 
avoid an outright social catastrophe in the territories of the former USSR.94
Even on this occasion, in late 1991 after independence had been secured, 
Savisaar deplored the folly of the restorers who ignored the Soviet expe-
rience of the previous fifty years. Savisaar’s keen interest in continuing to 
influence the political process in Russia should also be noted. This reflected 
the original idealist thought of the PF and its goal of aligning with Russian 
liberals in order to help the democratic process in the USSR. Savisaar’s par-
adigm, if it had been allowed to prevail in Estonian politics beyond 1991, 
might indeed have tied Estonia with processes in the East and delayed, if 
not hindered, Estonia’s reform and “return to the West”. In the following 
section we will compare Savisaar’s visions, informed by his life experience 
under the Soviet system, with the historical imagination of Lennart Meri.
Lennart Meri and the restoration of the foreign ministry
In contrast to Savisaar’s supposedly “Eastern European habitus”, Len-
nart Meri appeared to embody the vestiges of Europeanness still present 
in Estonia after fifty years of enforced Soviet rule, with his knowledge of 
languages and Western cultural tropes. The idea that Estonia had never 
parted with Europe, but Europe had left Estonia, later became a recurring 
theme in Meri’s speeches and diplomacy.95 
Meri’s father, Georg-Peeter Meri (1900–83), had been a promising career 
diplomat before the Second World War. Lennart still had fond memories of 
his father’s diplomatic postings and his years as a schoolboy in pre-war Ber-
lin and Paris. His childhood was cut short by the Soviet occupation. In 1941 
he was deported to Siberia with his mother and younger brother, whereas 
his father was separated from the family and was sentenced to death (he 
escaped execution). Georg-Peeter Meri was kept alive in Butyrka Prison 
by express order of Lavrenti Beria, because of his agreement to co-operate 
with Soviet counter-intelligence organizations. This relationship lasted 
93  Savisaar, Peaminister, 789–795.
94  Ibid., 789.
95  Pertti Grönholm, “Wars, suffering and survival in public history speeches by Esto-
nian Presidents (1992–2012)”, unpublished presentation delivered at the Yale Baltic-
Scandinavian Studies Conference, 13–15 March 2014.
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until the mid-1950s, when he felt safe to betray his masters. Even though 
this remained a well-preserved secret, his father’s mysterious connections 
to the KGB may have given Lennart Meri an “untouchable” air under the 
Soviet regime. As a writer and filmmaker, Lennart Meri traveled abroad 
frequently, even though he was not a member of the CPE. Unsurprisingly, 
this caused envy among his peer and rumors circulated of his work for the 
KGB, which were, nonetheless, groundless.96 
Meri stepped into office with a restorationist mindset. Foreign affairs, 
particularly the inept and tragic diplomacy of 1939–40, had been a frequent 
topic at his family’s kitchen table. In a letter to voters, as a candidate for 
the elections to the Supreme Soviet in March 1990, he said his family had 
known of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact since September 1939. Meri had 
had the opportunity to see documents related to the MRP on his trip to the 
Hoover Institute in the US in 1979, and he kept a copy of the secret protocol 
at his home.97 In 1989 he was involved in collecting material about the pact 
that was to be presented at the Congress of People’s Deputies in Moscow. 
Meri was also active in the Estonian Heritage Society since its estab-
lishment in 1987, even though he was more critical of the pre-war regime 
of Konstantin Päts than, for example, the EHS leader Trivimi Velliste.98 
Within the EHS, past events, especially the harshly repressed Estonian 
experiences of loss, resistance, suffering and survival, formed a new frame-
work for the future-oriented basis of national politics. Between 1987 and 
1989 the radical restorers, especially the EHS, envisioned the moral, social 
and economic collapse of the Soviet system. The corruption of Soviet legiti-
macy in all spheres of society and the state formed the “horizon of expec-
tations” of the radical restorers and also influenced their ideas about Esto-
nian foreign policy.99 
In the fall of 1989, Meri established the Estonian Institute, which was 
designed to send Estonian students abroad to study and to open Estonian 
cultural centers in foreign capitals that could be turned into diplomatic 
96  Jürjo, Pagulus ja Nõukogude Eesti, 280; Meri, Tagasivaateid veerevast vagunist.
97  Lennart Meri, “Kallis valija”, at Nõmme, 14 March 1990, Lennart Meri’s personal 
papers in the possession of Mart Meri. This information was supplied by Mart Meri, 
Tallinn, 26 August 2015. Meri has said that he received a copy of the secret protocol in 
1953 by post and kept it at home, Oplatka, Lennart Meri, 278.
98  Oplatka, Lennart Meri, 264; interview with Trivimi Velliste; Laar, Pööre, 18. Meri was 
present at the second meeting of the heritage society, if not earlier.
99  Grönholm, “Nostalgian ja utopian välissä,” 181. See also Trivimi Velliste’s speech 
delivered at the unveiling of President Konstantin Päts’ monument in Tahkuranna on 
25 June 1989, Muinsuskaitse Seltsi Sõnumid, 8:12 (1989).
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representations upon the restoration of independence.100 Meri actively 
sought practical and financial support from Western countries and was 
remarkably successful in this venture. The most important financial sup-
port for establishing an independent Estonian foreign policy came from 
the government of Finland, which secretly funneled hundreds of thousands 
of marks through the Finnish Ministry of Culture, Finnish NGO’s and the 
Tuglas Society to the Estonian Institute in Helsinki between 1990 and 1991. 
The Finns also equipped Meri and his staff with secure mobile phones, 
office space, cars, etc.101 On becoming foreign minister, Meri brought most 
of the young staff of the Estonian Institute into the foreign ministry, along 
with the benefits of the contacts and network affiliations he had estab-
lished abroad. 
On his first day as foreign minister, Meri symbolically gathered the staff 
of the small Soviet-type foreign ministry and announced that everyone had 
been fired.102 More important than the actual result (he had no authority 
to dismiss officials at will) was the symbolic significance of Meri’s act: it 
was clear that a new era had dawned in the institution. But this was not 
supposed to be a step into an unknown and uncertain future, but rather a 
restoration of the foreign ministry of the pre-war era.103
Looking at the period from the point of view of institutional history, it 
is clear that the foreign ministry in Estonia underwent significant trans-
formation. It changed from being a Soviet institution, which was not a 
foreign ministry in the conventional sense but a local section of the all-
Union foreign ministry chiefly responsible for foreign propaganda (and 
consular affairs),104 into an embryonic ministry with a full range of func-
tions. Before the regaining of independence in August 1991, the staff con-
sisted of only about fifty people, and its work was rather chaotic, as it was 
largely dependent on Lennart Meri’s intuition, charm and energy.105 Proper 
100  Oplatka, Lennart Meri, 273.
101  Heikki Rausmaa, Kyllä kulttuurin nimissä voi harrastella aika paljon: Suomen ja 
Viron poliittiset suhteet keväästä 1988 diplomaattisuhteiden solmimiseen elokuussa 1991, 
PhD dissertation (University of Helsinki, 2013), 190–191, 194. 
102  Tiina Freiberg’s recollections in Teine tulemine, 51. Peep Jahilo remembers Meri 
quipping that “there are many relative things in the world”. See Peep Jahilo’s recollec-
tions in Teine tulemine, 47. 
103  Oplatka, Lennart Meri, 300.
104  It should not be overlooked, however, that the foreign ministry had changed quite 
significantly since the adoption of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” in foreign affairs. There 
is no space in the present article to discuss the impact of perestroika on republican 
foreign activities.
105  See, for example, the recollections of Clyde Kull, Teine tulemine, 68.
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bureaucratic procedures were only gradually established after August 1991. 
What mattered most, however, was the almost complete change of person-
nel and the influx of young people, whom Meri encouraged, nurtured and 
protected. In contrast to Savisaar, Meri trusted young people, who came 
practically straight from university, to make the most important decisions 
(usually while he was not present). An influential group within the min-
istry formed the political department and included Jüri Luik (who was 
closest to Meri), Mart Nutt, Indrek Kannik and Tiit Pruuli.106 Their most 
valued qualification was English, which at the time was quite rare among 
the old bureaucracy. Equally important was their mindset, which was sup-
posedly uncorrupted by the Soviet system. Even if they had intended to 
make careers in the system – Nutt, for example, had decided to enter the 
CPE – times had begun to change before they could become part of the 
establishment. The foreign ministry also contained numerous Estonians 
who had been living abroad, such as Toivo Klaar and Peeter Mehisto, who 
brought much-needed language skills and a dynamic work ethic to this 
post-Soviet institution. As a result of these changes, the ministry obtained 
a distinctly Western outlook.
Toomas Alatalu has questioned the basis of Meri’s foreign affairs doc-
trine and has concluded that he had none: he simply accepted whatever 
advice he could from abroad.107 Alatalu is right in the sense that Meri never 
presented a written doctrine, despite consistent pressure from the foreign 
commission of the Supreme Soviet to do so. Alatalu is also correct when 
he notes that the commission’s purpose was to undermine Meri’s position, 
rather than to engage in dialogue. In this regard, Meri did well to ignore 
the commission as much as he could.108 The inclusion of former promi-
nent communists or careerists in the commission, like Indrek Toome or 
Tiit Made,109 made Meri cautious, as the group was trying to impinge on 
the foreign ministry’s executive autonomy. It was a characteristic ploy of 
Meri to send a deputy to represent the foreign ministry – in this instance 
106  Jüri Luik’s recollections in Teine tulemine, 158.
107  Alatalu, “Eesti välispoliitiline kontseptsioon”, 81–116.
108  Ibid., 110.
109  Tiit Made was a former attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. Predictably, 
Made’s posting at the Soviet Embassy gave rise to rumors of him being a KGB operative. 
These allegations were unfounded, although anyone in Made’s position had to report to 
intelligence organizations. The foreign commission became a vehicle for Made’s ambi-
tions and his poorly concealed desire to rise to the post of foreign minister.
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Enn Liimets, a former high-ranking communist turned Soviet diplomat – 
rather than meeting the commission personally.110 
In this connection it is necessary to note that Meri employed some for-
mer members of the establishment without ever explaining these decisions 
to his young disciples. One such employee was the lawyer Rein Müllerson, 
an ethnic Estonian who had already made a career in Moscow and had 
irked national activists with his anti-independence remarks. Despite this 
Meri appointed him second deputy foreign minister alongside Liimets. 
Meri’s choice might have been based on a reliance on people who knew 
“how things worked” in Soviet bureaucracy and in Moscow. Hence, he 
wanted to tap into the practical and diplomatic experience of someone 
like Liimets, or the knowledge of international law of someone like Mül-
lerson.111 Meri’s political flirtation with members of the former nomen-
klatura showed the complexity of his character, resulting from his experi-
ences during Soviet rule.
Perhaps because Meri’s political career constitutes a difficult case for 
academic analysis, his tenure in the foreign ministry has been most ade-
quately captured not by scholars, but by the author Mihkel Mutt in his novel 
Rahvusvaheline mees (The International Man). Mutt worked as Meri’s press 
chief,112 and in his novel the protagonist, Chief Rudolfo, is presented sym-
bolically as a dancer who can master all the world’s rhythms, choreograph-
ing his dances to circumstances. He is able to behave and act in Europe 
with a degree of smoothness unprecedented among his peers in the East. 
However, the figure of a dancer can also be taken as the portrayal of some-
one who is accustomed to “managing” his life under a repressive regime 
that is dominated by the Party and the KGB. Rudolfo is sufficiently flex-
ible to get along with Paks (Fat), who is presented as a sinister and menac-
ing figure of the Soviet type, whom everyone in the ministry fears, except 
110  Interviews with Enn Liimets; see also Alatalu, “Eesti välispoliitiline kontseptsioon», 
110.
111  Meri confided that Müllerson was a “difficult choice” even to foreign diplomats 
(Archive of the Foreign Ministry of Estonia, Tallinn  (Eesti Välisministeeriumi Arhiiv, 
hereafter EVA): Meri’s conversation with the US consul George Albert Krol, 1 July 1991, 
kohtumiste üleskirjutused). Two years earlier Müllerson had made “relatively pro-
Moscow statements”. But in “More about nations’ right to self-determination”, Moscow 
News (17–24 March 1991) Müllerson criticized the Union center harshly and argued for 
the independence of union republics. In 1993 Meri blocked the Estonian government’s 
attempt to prevent former leading communists from being able to participate in priva-
tization, Laar, Pööre, 102–104.
112  Mihkel Mutt, Rahvusvaheline mees (Tallinn, 1994); available in Finnish: Missio Viro 
(Helsinki: Kivijalka, 1997). For a perceptive commentary, see Linda Kaljundi, “Eesti lugu: 
Mihkel Mutt ‘Rahvusvaheline mees’”, Eesti Päevaleht, 14 August 2009.
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the chief. Needless to say, Paks is a caricature of Edgar Savisaar. Moreover, 
Mutt detects an underlining generational factor in power struggles in the 
ministry: the young stars team up with the pre-war generation of Rudolfo 
to push the middle-aged post-war generation, led and protected by Paks, 
out of the ministry, excluding it from Estonia’s future. 
Returning to the question of foreign-policy doctrine, Meri stated that 
his goal was to restore the Republic of Estonia on the basis of state conti-
nuity.113 According to Jüri Luik, legal continuity was his trump card on the 
international scene and to preserve this precious asset, the foreign ministry 
intervened in domestic politics more actively than is common in normal 
times. At government meetings, Meri resolutely blocked all motions that 
he perceived would weaken the claim to legal continuity.114 As to practical 
diplomacy, Meri had a more flexible position: meetings with foreign diplo-
mats were also partly used as a means of transmitting useful instructions as 
to whom the Estonians should meet, what aspects should be emphasized, 
etc.115 His talks with diplomats, like the Swedish Consul in Leningrad, Dag 
Sebastian Ahlander, or Paul Goble, the head of the Baltic desk at the US 
Department of State, were unusually frank. But rather than revealing any 
weakness, these conversations showed his intelligence and his ability to 
listen and to learn from people who possessed knowledge and experience 
that Estonia lacked at the time.116
From the very beginning of his political career Meri emphasized that 
foreign policy was essentially a dialogue,117 thus contrasting his diplomacy 
with the Congress of Estonia and Endel Lippmaa. Meri was hopeful that 
he could convince the West and Moscow of the utility of setting the Baltic 
states free. In an article dwelling on different tactics in Estonian foreign 
policy, he contrasted Lippmaa’s approach of making announcements at 
mass rallies to his search for compromise.118
However, in Meri’s opinion the best guarantee of securing Estonia’s 
eventual return to Europe was to not only sound European, but also to 
113  Lennart Meri, “Kompetentsi piiridest välispoliitikas”, Edasi, 20 December 1990.
114  Jüri Luik in Teine tulemine, 161.
115  Ibid., 160.
116  EVA: Lennart Meri’s meeting with Curtis W. Kamman and Paul Goble, 13 May 1991; 
Lennart Meri’s meeting with Dag Sebastian Ahlander, 18 October 1990; Lennart Meri’s 
meeting with Dag Sebastian Ahlander, 13 November 1990, Välisministri kohtumiste 
üleskirjutused, kõned (projektid), taustadokumendid 1990–1992.
117  “Maailmarändurist välisministriks. Lennart Meri: mistahes poliitika on alati dia-
loog”, Päevaleht, 19 April 1990.
118  Ibid.; EVA: “Elu võimalikkusest poliitikas”, Lennart Meri’s speech in Helsinki, 26 
November 1990, Lennart Meri kohtumiste teesid ja taustadokumendid 1990–1992.
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actually think and act as Europeans. In this regard he later remembered 
having a fractious relationship with Savisaar, who did not completely 
understand that Estonia should become a genuinely Western country.119 As 
a prerequisite of Estonia becoming part of the communicative space of the 
West,120 Meri’s interest in information verged on being a fixation. Through-
out the occupation years he had maintained a very personal link with the 
West via radio, keeping abreast with latest developments and maintaining 
his language skills. It was Meri who nominated Radio Free Europe for the 
Nobel Prize in 1991.121 He directed his energies to obtaining the right techni-
cal equipment in order to connect Estonia to the outside world without the 
interference of the KGB, which was still controlling Estonian borders and 
landline communications.122 As a man who represented a bridge between 
the present and pre-war Europe, he could also be surprisingly futuristic. 
Conclusion
The hypothesis of our research was that the period under study in this arti-
cle constituted a “critical juncture” in the formation of Estonian foreign 
policy. Indeed, the time from 1988 to 1991 comprised all the features mark-
ing an important watershed: there was a lot of competition over foreign 
policy, state institutions were in disarray and different groups and power-
ful individuals were competing for authority and power. Intellectuals held 
a disproportionally strong position in defining the values and interests of 
Estonian society after the transition from Soviet Estonia to the new inde-
pendent republic. In terms of the history of the Estonian foreign ministry, 
the years 1990–91 were probably crucial for its development as a modern, 
Western-looking institution, which would help realize Estonia’s ambition 
of joining powerful Western institutions, including the EU and NATO.123 
The most important cleavage that developed within the national move-
ment was based on conflicting interpretations of the past and personal life 
119  Oplatka, Lennart Meri, 310.
120  Peaminister Edgar Savisaare valitsuse programm (Tallinn: Riigikantselei trükikoda, 
1990), 6.
121  “Päevakaja: Eesti välisminister Lennart Meri Islandil”, Eesti raadio, 22 February 
1991, <http://arhiiv.err.ee/guid/17897> (accessed 13 June 2016).
122  Viljar Meister’s recollections in Teine tulemine, 60–61.
123  More research needs to be done to reach a more definitive conclusion as to which 
period was a “critical juncture” in the development of Estonian foreign policy, but it 
seems that Meri’s promotion of young cadres before August 1991 was one of the most 
important factors that influenced Estonian diplomacy in the following decades. Kaarel 
Piirimäe’s interview with Jüri Luik, Tallinn, 9 December 2015 (in the authors’ possession).
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experiences, as many scholars have already shown. We have analyzed how 
these differences influenced the construction of Estonian foreign policy 
and diplomacy. We have focused on two key players in defining Estonian 
identity and interests in the international arena: Prime Minister Edgar 
Savisaar and Foreign Minister Lennart Meri. Both were intellectuals with 
no shortage of ideational power necessary for laying “tracks” in order to 
forge new identities and interests. We think that Savisaar’s skepticism with 
regard to the West, his lingering attachment towards the East and his con-
viction that there had been much that was positive in the Soviet period that 
could be maintained in the “third republic”, had a lot to do with his gen-
erational mindset. In contrast to Meri, who vividly remembered life in free 
Estonia, Savisaar had little experience of any other society other than the 
Soviet Union. In a passionate article that defended his generation’s right 
and responsibility to remain in politics, he complained: “It is no longer 
considered polite to acknowledge that […] there was not only occupation, 
but also normal life: people worked and sweated, lived, loved and brought 
up children […] We are not yet a lost generation.”124 What emerges from 
this writing is a sense of bitterness that his generation – people who had 
devoted much of their lives to improving life in Soviet Estonia – is being 
isolated from the politics of independent Estonia based on accusations, 
erroneous or not, that they co-operated with the Soviet regime.
We detect no hesitation on the part of Meri about the need for Estonia 
to return to Europe as quickly as possible. The Europe Meri was imagining 
was the idealized pre-war Europe of his childhood, which he still remem-
bered and cherished as a counter-world to Soviet reality.125 He had made 
compromises with the regime and had used possibilities within the system 
for personal gain, but his view had always been that the Soviet occupation 
had to be transitory.126 Hence, in the late 1980s he welcomed movements 
that sought to restore historical truths and eventually to restore the great-
est of “treasures”:127 the pre-war republic. He thought the third republic, an 
idea supported by Savisaar, was a “completely absurd” idea that legitimized 
124  Edgar Savisaar, “Veel ei ole me jõudnud vabasse vette”, Sirp, 22 November 1991. 
This was in response to the announcement that Enn Põldroos, a veteran of the PF, was 
leaving politics.
125  Laar, Pööre, 167.
126  On this point see for example the testimony of a British diplomat who met Meri in 
Tallinn in summer 1981, J. K. Gordon, “Meeting with Lennart Meri”, 2 July 1981, FCO 
28/4603, National Archives, United Kingdom.
127  Ibid., 18.
508 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2016, 3/4 (157/158)
the quislings of 1940 and their descendants.128 Meri did not find natural 
allies in the post-war generation of Edgar Savisaar, but in the younger gen-
eration (the transitional generation129) that looked suspiciously upon the 
post-war generation as people who had been corrupted by the Soviet sys-
tem. It was for this reason that he staffed the new foreign ministry with 
very young people, who were flexible, open to influences from the West 
and were able to learn quickly.130 Meri fiercely guarded the autonomy of the 
ministry against encroachments from the old bureaucracy and Savisaar 
himself. He even assured that he would be succeeded in his post by some-
one directly from the West – the Swedish Estonian Jaan Manitski – when 
he was forced to resign in April 1992.131 That Estonia was restored on the 
principle of legal identity with the pre-war republic was assured, at least 
partly, by the foreign ministry under Meri.
Finally, looking at the figure of Savisaar, his values and the interests he 
represented, we think there was an alternative to Estonia’s decisive return 
to the West. His progressive mindset and his desire to influence processes 
in the former Soviet Union would have thwarted Estonia’s reform for a 
considerable time. Paradoxically, the quickest way back to Europe was via 
the past: the restorers of the pre-war republic, whom Savisaar castigated as 
naïve and unsophisticated, actually proved to be the most radical reform-
ers (as shown by the government of Mart Laar that was formed in 1992). 
One of the prices Estonia (and also Latvia and Lithuania) had to pay for 
its return to the West, besides the high social costs of acute transforma-
tion and liberal economic policies, was the deterioration of relations with 
Russia, which had hoped to keep the states under some sort of tutelage. 
This was exactly what Savisaar had warned against before he was forced 
to resign in January 1992.132 
It has to be pointed out that the individuals-based point of view that we 
decided to adopt in this paper is not the only way to historicize the Baltic 
states’ return to the West. What we were not able to do was to draw com-
parisons with similar processes in Lithuania, Latvia or the other former 
Soviet republics. For example, it can be suggested that the rivalry between 
Vytautas Landsbergis, the Lithuanian Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, 
128  Oplatka, Lennart Meri, 289.
129  Wulf and Grönholm, “Generating meaning across generations”, 369–372.
130  Interview with Jüri Luik.
131  On Manitski as successor, Oplatka, Lennart Meri, 342.
132  Savisaar, “Veel ei ole me jõudnud”. Pointing at Estonia’s laws that left the Russian-
speaking minority without citizenship, he anticipated “long-term tensions in relations 
with the East”.
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and Prime Minister Kazimira Prunskienė was analogous to that of Meri 
and Savisaar; but that the Lithuanian foreign minister Algirdas Saudargas 
never played an independent role equal to that of Meri.133 Another area, 
which should be left for future analyses, is the relative popularity of either 
returning to the West or steering a middle course between the East and the 
West among the wider public, and how the shifting opinions affected poli-
tics. Our work also has implications for Soviet studies more generally, all of 
which we have not been able to discuss. For example there is the debate to 
what extent the homo sovieticus of late Socialism was actually Soviet. This 
research, at least the example of Lennart Meri, seems to support the view 
that informal associations and networks did create a non-Soviet space in 
which the cultivation of non-Soviet ideas, the survival of non-Soviet peo-
ple so to speak, were possible.134 
Last but not least, beside societal aspects one could consider interna-
tional ones: the remarkable continuity from the pre-war to the post-Cold 
War era, which the father Georg and son Lennart Meri represented, gives 
credence to the view that the Baltic question had not been solved but only 
placed into a “cold storage” after the end of the Second World War,135 and 
this poses interesting questions about the basis of state continuity in prac-
tical politics and not just in international law.
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Kokkuvõte: Ajalooteadvus, isiklikud elukogemused ja Eesti 
välispoliitika pöördumine Läände, 1988–1991
Riikide julgeoleku- ja välispoliitikat kujundab kollektiivne identiteet, mis 
toetub ühiskonnas poolehoiu võitnud ajaloodiskursusele. Stabiilse ja usal-
dusväärse välispoliitika tegemiseks peavad valitsused suutma konstruee-
rida ja sõnastada alusnarratiive (loomismüüte) rahvuse ja riigi kujune-
misest ning arengust. Nendest lugudest kujuneb diskursiivne raamistik, 
milles sõnastatakse rahvuse tulevikueesmärgid ja huvid rahvusvahelises 
poliitikas. Kuna suveräänne riik vajab välispoliitikas ja diplomaatias üht-
sust, kiidab iga valitsus heaks teatud ajaloonarratiivid ning heidab kõrvale 
teised. Suveräänne diplomaatia nõuab ametliku ajaloo olemasolu. Seega 
põhimõtteliselt kujutab riikidevaheline diplomaatia läbirääkimisi erisu-
guste ajalootõlgenduste vahel (näide: eri ajaloonägemustest tulenevad eri-
meelsused Eesti-Vene suhetes). 
Eesti oli aastatel 1988 kuni 1991 jõudnud teelahkmele (kasutame ing-
liskeelset mõistet critical juncture). Nõukogulikust riigikorrast teise riigi-
korda üle minnes valitses institutsionaalne kaos. Mõningaid asutusi, nagu 
välisministeerium, tuli alles üles ehitama hakata. Sellises olukorras saavad 
otsustavaks üksikud tugevad ja ideelised isiksused. Olulisteks faktoriteks 
on nende inimeste elukogemus ning tõlgendused ajaloost.
Käesolev artikkel analüüsib välisminister Lennart Meri ja peaminister 
Edgar Savisaare eluloo, kogemuste ning ajalooteadvuse mõju nende tule-
vikunägemustele. Uurime, kuidas kogemustele toetunud ootused kujun-
dasid nende otsuseid ja käitumist kriitilistel hetkedel. 
Uuritud perioodil kujunes kaks põhimõtteliselt lahknevat seisukohta 
Eesti minevikust ja järelikult ka tulevikust. Ühed olid taastajad ja teised 
olid reformijad. Savisaar paigutub oma vaadetelt reformijate hulka. Ta nägi 
Nõukogude perioodis mõndagi positiivset, mida ära kasutada ka tulevi-
kus. Tema “kolmanda vabariigi” kontseptsioon peegeldas paljude teistegi 
sõjajärgse põlvkonna-kaaslaste seisukohti. Savisaar ei olnud veendunud, 
et Lääne kapitalism kätkeb endas lahendusi globaalprobleemidele. Tun-
des end kodusemalt postsovetlikus ruumis kui Läänes, suunas Savisaar 
oma diplomaatilise tegevuse teraviku suhetele Nõukogude Liidu ja Nõu-
kogude liiduvabariikidega. Sellele valikule aitas kaasa ka tööjaotus Savi-
saare valitsuses.
Meri oli vaadetelt pigem taastaja kui reformija. Olles sündinud 
ennesõjaegses Eesti Vabariigis, kandis ta kogu okupatsiooniaja hinges 
nägemust vabast Eestist, mis on osa vabast Euroopast. Ta hoidis Lääne 
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kultuuriruumiga pidevat sidet, kuna see “alternatiivmaailm” aitas toime 
tulla Nõukogude ühiskonna rusuva reaalsusega. Meri oli küll läinud Nõu-
kogude režiimiga teatavatele kompromissidele, nagu enamik teisi, kuid ta 
uskus alati, et okupatsioon on pikemas perspektiivis mööduv. 1980. aas-
tatel osales ta aktiivselt liikumistes, mis püüdsid ajaloolist tõde päeva-
valgele tuua. Meri oli veendunud, et Savisaare idee kolmandast vabarii-
gist on “täiesti absurdne” mõte, millega tahetakse heaks kiita 1940. aasta 
kvislingeid ja nende järeltulijaid. Meri loomulikud liitlased ei olnud mitte 
sõjajärgses põlvkonnas, vaid nooremate hulgas, kes suhtusid vanemasse, 
Nõukogude ühiskonnas “karastunud” põlvkonda umbusklikult. Meri 
võttis välisministeeriumi tööle noori, kelle põhilisteks eelisteks olid keel-
teoskus, kogenematus ja õppimisvõime. Just Meri ajal kujunes välisminis-
teeriumist Euroopale suunatud moodne ametkond, mis kindlustas Eesti 
püüdlusi integreeruda Läände. 
Eesti otsustav pöördumine Läände ei olnud ettemääratud ega parata-
matu. Järeldame, et Eesti kõige radikaalsemad, läänemeelsed reformijad 
olid just taastajad, kelle paleuseks, kuid mitte kinnisideeks, oli sõjajärgne 
Eesti. Seega, paradoksaalselt läks otsetee tulevikku mineviku kaudu.

